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Summary  findings
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing will abolish all  From India's viewpoint, the European Union is ahead
quota restrictions in trade in textiles and clothing by the  of the United States in dismantling the quota regime -
year 2005. Dismantling the quota regime represents both  and in not restricting Indian cotton (garment) exports
an opportunity (for developing countries to expand  (where India has a comparative advantage) more than
exports) and a threat (because  quotas will no longer  synthetics.
guarantee markets and even the domestic market will be  India's strengths in this sector lie in natural resou-ces
open to competition).  and factor endowments - raw cotton and cheap labor.
Data about the real burden imposed by distorting but  The Indian garment industry's decentralized production
nontransparent policies under the quota regime are  structure - subcontracting, which is low risk and low
inadequate, so Kathuria and Bhardwaj  interviewed  capital -has  served the industry well but has excluded
traders in Delhi and Bombay about quota rents. They  Indian products from the mass market for clothing,
provide comprehensive  estimates of the magnitude of the  which demands consistent quality for large volumes of a
implicit export taxes resulting from the labyrinth of  single item.
quotas imposed under the WTO Agreement on Textiles  Growth in Indian exports may require a shift to an
and Clothing. Using  the concept of an export tax  assembly-line,  factory-type system. This would probably
equivalent  (or  ETE), they assess  how much exports are  require:
restricted.  *  No longer restricting garment production to the
The international trade regime in textiles and clothing  small-scale  sector (and ending other anachronistic
imposes a substantial  tax equivalent on Indian exports.  policies).
Between 1993 and 1997, ETEs for garment exports to  * Making labor policy more flexible.
the United States were roughly double those for the  * Ending the policy bias against synthetic fibers.
European Union. The ETEs for the United States  * Reducing transaction costs for exports.
declined in 1996, which could be a warning signal that
India faces  increasing competition from a NAFTA-
empowered Mexico.
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. Background
India has a very old and rich tradition  in the textile industry. Today, it is the single  largest source
of employment and net foreign exchange earnings (table I  shows that exports of textiles, yarn and
garments  were nearly $8 billion in 1996-97  or 23.7%  of total exports). However,  it also happens  to be the
one of the remaining  sectors  where Government  intervention  is all-pervasive.  This, along  with the weight
of tradition,  has meant that the textile sector in India has developed  in aunique way.  The question  that
demands  an urgent answer  is whether  the industry  is capable  of meeting  the challenge  of a post-Uruguay
Round  world, wherein  there will be not only be increased  competition  for export  markets,  but also import
competition  for the domestic  market.
This paper is woven around the  -primary  data collected  through interviews  with various garmnent
and textile exporters  and quota brokers in India. Section II of the paper deals with the complex quota
administration  system in India and estimates the export tax equivalents  of the MFA regime for Indian
textiles and garments  by categories  and, perhaps for the first time, by fiber (cotton and non-cotton).  In
sections III and IV we discuss the major domestic constraints  confonting the garments and textiles
sectors. We also suggest  possible policy actions.  Section  V discusses  transactions  costs of trade policies,
and section  VI summarizes  and concludes.
II.  Intemational  Trade  in Textiles:  Export Tax  Equivalents
Measurement  of Quota  Rents
World trade in yarn, textiles and apparel has been regulated by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA) since 1974,  the sequel to an increasingly  pervasive  quota  regime that began with the Short Term
Arrangement  on cotton products in 1962. The MFA framework  provides  for imposition  of import  quotas
by developed countries on the exports of these products from developing countries.  The quotas are
usually negotiated bilaterally under threat of unilateral restraints by the importer.  The quotas can
tFor comments  and suggestions,  we are extremely  grateful  to Will  Martin  and Garty  Pursell. We would  also like  to thank
Harpinder  Oberai  for help in editing  the paper.
2discriminate  by fiber and by function:  typical  examples  are ladies'  cotton blouses,  gents' shirts, etc. The
MFA has now been replaced by the Agreement  on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which has the same
MFA framework  but in the context of an agreed,  ten year phasing  out of all quotas  by the year 2005. This
phase out creates new opportunities  and challenges  that policy makers must understand if they are to
frame the right policy  responses.
The  MFA/ATC (for  ease of  reference we  shall henceforth use  only  MFA) quotas are
administered  by the exporting  countries. If the quotas are binding,  then quota rights command a price,
and in many countries  these rights  are allowed  to be traded. In order to export,  a firm either has to buy a
quota in the market or forego selling  one it owns. This imposes  a cost on the firm exactly  analogous  to an
export  tax. One could  also think of the quotas  as introducing  implicit  export  taxes levied by the exporting
country  government,  which are then redistributed  to specific  firms (i.e. to those who own the quotas). 21t
needs to be remembered,  however, that the taxes arise from the restrictions imposed by the importing
country. We define the export tax equivalent (ETE) as the value of the quota divided by the price
received  by a producer who does not own quota  for this  product.
Why are we interested  in calculating  quota  rents? Because  protection  measures  like the MFA are
non-transparent,  so that neither the countries  imposing  the protection,  nor those suffering from it, know
what rate of protection  is being imposed. In the absence  of such hard estimates,  many studies are based
on assumed values for the critical protection parameters.  Quota rents, which are one measure of
protection,  measure  the distortion  resulting  from the quotas,  and are one element in an overall calculation.
of the losses  and benefits  arising  from  the MFA regime.
Figure 1 shows  the simplest  representation  of the MFA. Since  MFA involves  restrictions  only on
imports into major developed country markets, two import markets have to be considered even in the
simplest  case. In this figure total import  demand consists  of two components,  ED* and ED**,  with ED*
being  the net demand  for imports  by the developed  countries  and ED**  the excess demand  for imports  by
the rest of the world. Total world demand corresponds  to the curve ED (horizontal  aggregation  of ED*
and ED**) and total supply  of exports  from the developing  countries  is given by excess supply curve  ES.
In the absence  of a quota, the world price, Pe, is that at which total import demand equals total export
supply.  Restrictions  of the MFA type  might, in principle,  be represented  by the quota limit  Q*.
2See Martin  (1996),  Martin  and Supachalasai  (1990),  and Trela  and Whalley  (1990).







Source: Adaptedfrom  Will Martin and Suphat Suphachalasai  (1990, p 51)
The imposition of such a quota reduces total world import demand, shifting the world demand
curve to the left to a new, kinked demand curve EDab. Following imposition of the quota the world price
falls to Pp, which increases consumption in the rest of the world. The price in the restricted market after
the imposition of quotas is assumed to be Pc. Thus quota rents equalling  (Pc-Pp).Q* are generated with
the quota having exactly the same effect as an export tax of (Pc-Pp)3.
While quota rents are a gain for exporting countries, these gains must be weighed against the
reduction  in the  price  of  exports to unrestricted  markets, arising  from the  decline  in  demand  in the
restricted markets.  In the figure, the shaded areas represent this gain and loss of producers' surplus. Also,
since the MFA diverts output from low cost to high cost producers, the average cost of world textiles
output must increase, leading to a decline in world demand, which in turn reduces the derived demand for
fibers, and hence  fiber prices.  These costs  are important for fiber producing countries  such as India.
While it is likely that  highly restricted and  dynamic textile exporters  such as, for  example,  India and
3 The demand  curves  for individual  countries  will  of course  be much  flatter  than in the figure,  which represents  world  demand
and supply.  In fact, small  countries  could  be represented  as price  takers.
4Pakistan  will on the whole have suffered substantial,  costs from the imposition  of quotas 4, we do not
have exact calculations  of net welfare. In this paper, we will focus only on the estimation  of quota rents
and ETEs for Indian garment  and textile exports. Other things being equal, a higher ETE would imply a
more restrictive  MFA regime.
Quota Administration in India
In India,  the quotas  for garments  and knitwear  are administered  by the Apparel  Export Promotion
Council (AEPC), while those for yarn, fabrics and made-ups  are done by the Cotton Textiles Export
Promotion  Council except for certain categories of synthetic textiles, which are administered by the
Synthetic  and Rayon Textiles  Export  Promotion  Council.
The 1997-99  allotment  policy is as follows. In the case of garments,  the highlights  are:
*  Quotas are levied by category.  As much as 75 percent of the quotas each year are allotted against a
past performance  entitlement  (PPE), and the balance  is distributed  against  new investors' entitlement
(NIE) (10 percent),  first come first served (FCFS)  entitlement  (10 percent),  and non-quota  exporters'
(NQE)  entitlement  (5 percent).
*  The PPE is allotted pro-rata on the basis of the value of exports to the country-category  in the base
year 5. Within the 75 percent quota,  5 percent is reserved  for those firms realizing a higher unit value
than the average during  the base year.
*  The PPE quota has to be utilized between  January 1 and September  30, and has to be surrendered
thereafter  unless extended  up to December  31.
*  The  FCFS quotas are released on January 10 and April 10 of each year, and allotments  are made on a
per day basis. Within the day rationing  is done on the basis of higher unit value realization  of export
orders  amongst  the applications,  supported  by valid letters of credit.
*  The NIE is designed  to give an incentive for new investments,  and allocates 1000 pieces per Rs.
100,000  of admissible  investments. These 1000  pieces are divided  equally into at least five country-
categories  and allotment is restricted  to those quota  categories  relevant  to the manufacturing  facilities
of the applicant.
4 See Martin  (1996)
5The  phrase  "base  year" for an allotment  year  means  the calendar  year preceding  the year immediately  before  that allotment
year,  for e.g. the base  year for  the year 1997  is 1995.
5*  The NQE entitlements  are made pro-rata  on the basis of value of exports  to non-quota  countries  and
non-quota  exports  to quota countries.
*  The  PPE and NQE entitlements  are transferable,  while  the others are not. Quota  transfers  are allowed
only until September  20 of each year, but only 50 percent are transferable  after May 31. Transferred
quotas  have to be used by September  30 unless  extended  until December  31.
In the case of yarn and textiles,  the PPE at 55 percent is much lower than for garments. More
weight is  given for  manufacturer exporter entitlements (those who  have undertaken substantial
modernization,  being 15 percent for all categories  of yarn and textiles except handlooms, where it is
zero), ready good exporters' entitlements  (allotted on a first come first served basis, and is 15 to 40
percent), and the balance  going to NQE and/or  to powerloom  exporters  entitlement  (the latter in the case
of certain  fabrics  and made-ups). Although  the data we have collected  for this study pertain to a different
period than described  by the above allotment  policies,  the policies have not changed  very much,  with the
changes  being  in the details.  6
The point of giving details of the quota allotment policies is to illustrate  some of the distortions
created by them. 7 One, the system disaggregates  further  the narrowly defined quota categories,  as we
saw above.  This multiplies several fold the number of quota categories defined by the importing
countries, and has resulted in a "...vast quota administering  bureaucracy  with its own vested interests"
(Kumar and Khanna, 1990: 201). Two, and following  from this, the chances of quota under-utilization
are higher  the greater the number  of quota sub-categories  and other rules and regulations,  especially  in
the face of a less than efficient transfer  mechanism:  the classic problem of "fragmentation", Three, at
least some of the substantial  fluctuation  in quotapremia  over a year can be attributed  to the way that the
quotas are allocated,;  owing:  to the free for all FCFS quota system  as well as the system of within  the day
trading. Four, the firms with PPE quotas  often use their PPE allocations  to subsidize  their bids under the
FCFS system, which results in price distortions. Five, the FCFS system resulted in a proliferation  of
ghost firms, with firms submitting  multiple applications  at different unit prices. AsTrela and Whalley
(1990) point out, some of these quota allocation procedures  can lead to economic inefficiency. The
existence of past performance quotas protects existing firms from new competition and creates a
disincentive (albeit not an insurmountable  barrier) for new firms to enter.  Also, there is not enough
incentive  to diversify to non-quota  markets. Another problem  is the rent seeking behavior  of the firms
6 For example,  in the case of garments  in the 1996-98  policy,  the PPE entitlement  was 80 percent,  and that for FCFS was  20
percent  including  that for  new investors'  entitlement,  For a history  of policies  in the 1980s,  see Kumar  and Khanna  (1990).
7 Most  of this paragraph  draws  from  Kumar  and Khanna  (1990: 199-202).  Also  see Trela  and Whalley  (1990).
6who have PPEs and who try to create scarcities by holding on to the quotas and selling at the highest
possible price.
Data Sources
In a task such as this, we could not proceed without reliable data. Not only did we need the prices
at which quotas are transferred (quota premia), but also a fiber-wise (i.e. between cotton and non-cotton)
break-up  of  the  premia  across  all  categories  of  products.  Unfortunately,  the  quota  administering
authorities, the Apparel Export Promotion Council and the Textiles Export  Promotion Council, do not
maintain records of prices at which quotas are transferred.
We therefore turned to the exporters hoping they would have documented their quota transfers.
On approaching the garment exporters, however, it became clear that the biggest players in the market as
far as quota transactions are concerned are the quota agents / brokers. We concentrated on meeting these
brokers and collecting information from them. The data have been collected from the records of a set of
six quota brokers and five exporters based in Delhi and Bombay. We found that a handful of quotaagents
are responsible for a large  share of quota transactions; also each exporter  interviewed actually  owns a
large  number  of registered  firms.  These  firms  are owned by  the  exporters  but  are registered  under
different names so that none of the firms exceeds the maximum permissible limit of investment stipulated
under  the small  scale  industries  law (see section III). In other words, our apparently  small  sample is
probably quite representative of the quota transactions in the garment industry.
For garments there are primarily four centers where quota trading takes place on a large scale in
India - Delhi, Bombay,  Madras and Bangalore. The information we collected was from exporters  and
agents in Delhi - however these figures appear to be representative of all the centers, because of arbitrage.
If there  emerges a  large difference  in premia between the centers,  then trading  of quotas takes  place
across states which balances demand and supply, thereby more or less equating the quota premia across
states.
In the  case  of textiles  however, a major  part of the  transactions takes  place  in Bombay.  We
therefore  prepared  a  questionnaire  and  sent  it  to  different  quota  agents  there.  We  also  collected
information from some agents in Delhi, and the figures were very close.
7The credibility of the data collected for both garment and textiles sectors was enhanced by the
fact that the variation in figures reported by  different sources was narrow in most cases.
There are day to day variations in the quota premia for the various categories. All categories have
individual quota premia except USA Group II products for which the premium exists for the group as a
whole. Since it was impossible to gather information for quotapremia on a daily basis, we took the range
within which quota premia fluctuated for any given year, and eventually used the average of the range.
Finally, in order to arrive at the quota premium for any given year for any particular category, we used
the simple average of the figures quoted by the different sources. The data have  been aggregated into
simple and weighted averages. In the calculation of weighted averages, the weights have been formulated
using all products having a non-zero ETE  in any of the years under consideration (1993-96).
What  lies  behind  the  quota premia  are, of course,  more fundamental  issues relating  to  the
competitiveness of the industry. This is what we discuss in the second half of this paper. In doing so we
drew not only upon our meetings with quota brokers, but also interviews with exporters, manufacturers,
policy makers and industry associations.
Export  Tax Equivalents:  the Results
ETEs are calculated here on the basis of unit values of exports, as [QP/(UV-QP)]  *  100, where QP
is the  quota premium  and  WV  the unit value  of exports. The ETE indicates the  quota premium  as a
percentage of the premium-less unit value of exports8.  Apart from the  individual ETEs calculated for
each quota category, we have also aggregated the quotas by country or region and by fiber.
The paper assumes that ETE  can be equated with restrictiveness of the import regime. Intuitively,
the ETE represents  an excess demand in the form of a price, reflecting how much extra importers are
willing to  pay for  Indian goods, given that they  can also pay  extra  for  goods of other countries. An
increase in ETE (or a higher ETE for a product) for a product/s will mean that the regime has become
more restrictive.  However this  is not the  same  as an increase  in  competitiveness:  if the  Indian  ETE
increases, that  for China  can increase even  more, which  means that  if quotas were  abolished,  China
would gain market share at India's  expense. Thus, the magnitude of ETE  on its own is not an indicator of
competitiveness (for that we would need other countries' ETEs, as well as size of quotas and exports). In
81n  figure  1,  the  ETE  is  [(P, -Pp)/Pp]*  100.
8terms of our usage, ETE is an indicator  of  how restricted  Indian exports are, given the demand and
supply  situation  at that time for that product.
In this exercise, we focussed on the two largest markets for Indian textiles and garments, the
USA and the EU, which accounted  for 73 percent  of total textile exports  in 1995/96. As a proportion  of
quota-restricted  (MFA)  markets,  their share is even higher, accounting  for 94 percent of total exports in
1995/96.  For the USA as a whole, table 2 and figure l(a) shows that overall (weighted by value of
exports)  ETE,  which was 38.8 percent  of the unit value of exports  in 1993,  and 36-37 percent in 1994  and
1995, declined to 28 percent in  1996. Exports to the EU appear far less restricted, with aggregate
weighted  ETEs  being around 14 percent between 1993  and 1995,  increasing  to about 19 percent in 1996
(table 2). Thus, while exports to the USA are tightly constrained,  there appears to have been a slight
relaxation of this constraint in 1996, coinciding  perhaps with an  increase in the competitiveness  of
Mexican exports arising from NAFTA 9. While there have been improvements  in access to the EU
market for suppliers  in Eastern  Europe  and Turkey,  this has not had an impact  on India's ETE so far.
Figure  l(a)  - Weighted  Average of  ETEs for  the USA (%)  Figure  l(b)  - Simple Average  of  ETEs for  the  USA (%)
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Table 2 and figure l(b) also show the average ETEs for different groups  of products in the US
market. As opposed  to the weighted  average,  the simple  average shows  that there was a dramatic  decline
in overall  ETEs from 17 percent  in 1994  to 7 percent  in 1995. This was on account of the decline  in ETE
for Group  II products. Group  I Iproducts,  whose exports  are far larger, counteracted  this decline with an
increase in their weighted as'well as simple average ETEs in 1995, which accounts for the overall
weighted  ETE increasing  in 1995. In 1996, on the other hand,'  there was no major decline in Group  II,
9 Research reported in The Economist (July 5, 1997) on the NAFTA effect appears to indicate that big American textile firms
have been investing in Mexico since the genesis of NAFTA in 1994. The author of the research, Gary Gereffi, says that big
retailers from the USA were starting to promote Mexican made goods through their North American networks.
9but Group I products showed  a decline  in both weighted  and simple average ETEs,  which accounts  for
the aggregate  weighted  ETE declining  from 37 to 28 percent.
A disaggregation  by product  category  (Table  3) reveals  that the decline  in ETEs  in 1995/96  in the
USA is largely confined  to items in Group II, as is implicit in the simple average  ETE numbers of the
respective  groups'O.  In Group  I products, the decline in ETEs in 1996 (simple average ETE down from
26% in 1995  to 23% in 1996)  arises very largely  on account  of the decline  in category  338/339 from 101
to 58 percent, which has to be seen in the light of the fact that 101 percent may  itself be an aberration.
What is more significant and necessary to explain is the decline in Group II, which in fact took place in
1995 and continued  thereafter into 1996  (as well as 1997). The most likely explanation  is the decline  in
quota utilization  in Group II in 199511.  According to AEPC statistics, quota utilization in Group II
declined from 87.5 percent in 1994  to 75 percent in 1995 (in Group I, on the other hand, there was an
increase in utilization  from 103 to 104 percent). The NAFTA explanation  is difficult to admit, since it
should  have  affected  both Group  I and II products  and at the same  time.
Another possible explanation  revolves around the fact that Group II quotas are a block for the
group  as a whole, and not for individual  products. Thus,  the rupee premium  is applicable  to Group  II as a
whole (the ETE is different  for each product  because  of different  unit values). If there is a sudden  change
in demand  for certain  products  within  the Group,  it will affect the premium  for the entire group.
It seems that the demand for small jackets rose sharply in 1993 and 1994, and then declined in
1995, leading to the observed change in premium. This explanation  is valid only if there is informal
quota segmentation  in Group II between products and/or there are other imperfections  in the quota
allocation  system,  which is quite likely since it is based on bidding  through informal  networks  with deals
usually  being done over the telephone.
The story then would be that it is as yet unclear  whether  the observed  decline  in India's ETEs  to
the USA is part of a secular trend or  an aberration  for 1995/1996. Given the backloading  of the quota
liberalization in the ten year transition period, and a probable increase in competitiveness  of Indian
textiles and garments  if domestic policies are liberalized, the ETEs may not drop, but we cannot be sure.
It should  aso be noted that ETEs in the range of 28-37 percent for the USA are higher than the actual
IOThe 1997 data are preliminary since they do not cover the full year.
However in 1996 the quota utilization rate recovered to over 100 percent.
10tariffs  levied by  the USA  on imports of textiles and apparel, and give one  (partial) indication  of the
hidden cost of the MFA, both for the exporting as well as the importing country.
Given the nature of the MFA, the importing country may try to put greater restrictions in the path
of products in which  exporters have a greater comparative advantage.  In India's  case, it is well-known
that its comparative advantage clearly lies in cotton as opposed to other fibers (but see section IV).  This
is corroborated by tables 5 and 6 (and Figures 2(a) and 2(b)) which show the weighted average ETE for
cotton and synthetic products, separately, aggregated across all apparel categories 1 2. For cottons, the ETE
for USA was around 50 percent between 1993 and 1995, declining to 39 percent in 1996.  As expected,
the ETE for synthetics was far lower, being  13 percent in 1994 and  16 percent in 1995 and  1996.  Not
only this, for cottons, the products with the highest ETEs also have the highest weights in overall cotton
garment exports. In 1995, for example, categories 338/339 (knit shirts and blouses) and 340 (gents shirts
non-knit) had ETEs of 99 and 53 percent, respectively, and shares of 31 and 27 percent in cotton exports.
In other words, the most popular cotton products are also the most restricted.
Figure 2(a) - Weighted Average of ETEs by Fibers for the USA  Figure 2(b) - Weighted Average of ETEs by Fiber for the EU
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On  the other  hand, for  synthetics, products  with very high  ETEs have  a very  low weight  in
overall exports of synthetics. Thus, in  1995, the products with highest ETEs of 110 (category 338/339)
and 56 percent (category 640, gents shirts non-knit) had weights of only 0.35 and  1 percent respectively,
whereas the most popular synthetic items had lower ETEs: category 636 (dresses including uniform, ETE
1 2Keeping in mind the caveat (see beginning of this section) that comparative advantage does not have a simple correspondence
with ETEs. It is conceivable, for example, that a  lower ETE product can be more competitive than one with a higher ETE - its
low ETE may simply be because of a  very liberal quota. Another problem arises from the export controls on yarn and cotton
(see section IV). Since sometimes the best alternative to exporting cotton garments is to sell them domestically (where prices can
be lower than border prices owing to expoit restrictions), higher ETEs for cotton garments can sometimes result.
1129, weight  30 percent),  category  642 (ladies skirts,  ETE 21, weight  23 percent)  and category  641 (ladies
blouses  and shirts, ETE 8, weight  19 percent)l 3.
For the EU, this behavior is less noticeable. Weighted average ETEs for cotton were 13-14
percent over 1993-1995,  and 17 percent in 1996. For synthetics,  the ETEs  were higher  than for cotton in
1995  and 1996,  being 17 and 23 percent  respectively. The simple  reason is that a lot more exports to the
EU are of products which are outside QRs, i.e., either non-restrained  (although within the MFA) or
outside  the MFA. For example  (see table 7), in 1996,  as much  as 29 percent  of the value of total garment
exports were outside  QRs. In the case of the USA, only 8 percent  of garment  exports were outside  QRs.
Thus, a significant  proportion  of exports which would  otherwise  have generated  considerable  quota rents
have already  been given free trade  status.
In other words, at least as far as India is concerned,  the EU is further ahead in reducing the
restrictiveness  of the MFA regime  than the USA:  reflected  in the fact that a) ETEs  are on average lower in
the EU; b) the differential in average ETEs for cotton (in  which India has a  strong comparative
advantage)  in the two regions is even more than in overall ETEs; c) the differential  between  cotton and
synthetic  ETEs in the EU is not large, unlike in the USA. Of course, if the observed lower ETEs in the
European market reflect greater trade diversion towards favored markets, then the lower protection
against  Indian  products  may benefit neither  the EU nor India.
The implications,  at least for the USA, are: one, cotton is more restricted  as a whole since it is
more disruptive for the importing  countries  (three-fourths  of MFA garment exports of India are cotton
products);  two, this logic can be extended to within fiber categories,  since it is the most popular (and
hence most disruptive  for importers)  cotton products whose exports are most highly restricted. On the
other  hand, the popular  synthetic  items are not restricted  as much, since  their exports are relatively  small
in absolute  terms and are hence less disruptive  for the importing  country. This does not apply to the EU,
where a far greater proportion  of exports  are outside  the QR import  route.
Another issue is related  to the incentive  to diversify  away from high ETE products. If ETEs are
high, and if the quota administration  mechanism  is less than perfect, then there could be an incentive  for
1 3It may be argued  that the above  conclusions  are based  merely  on our use of weighted  averages.  If we use simple averages,
table 2 shows that the difference  between  ETEs of cottons  and synthetics  is lower,  and therefore  the conclusions  that cotton is
more competitive  and that more  competitive  products are more  restricted  is not as strong.  In other words, if synthetics  had a
larger quota,  they would also have seen  higher exports.  However  the fact that exports of cottons  are far greater  than synthetics,
even for non-quota  countries,  substantiates  our inferences  ,e.g. the share of cotton in total garment  exports was 64% in  value
terms  for countries  outside  bilateral  agreements  in 1996-97.
12exporters  as a group to diversify  towards  non-quota  products/countries,  or to lower ETE items. Table  8
shows calculations  of ETEs for quota garments  exclusively  as well as for all garments, whether or not
within  the restricted  categories. The ETE  for all products  will naturally  be lower (for non-QR  items, the
ETE  will be zero although  the weight  will be positive),  and will reflect  the actual  extent to which exports
take place outside  the QR regime.
The table shows  that the ETE  for all products  in the case of the USA is usually  only 2-3 percent
points lower than the quota  driven  ETE, whereas  for the EU it is 4-5 percent points lower. The reason of
course is that a higher percentage  of exports  to the EU are non-quota,  which have a zero ETE  and hence
bring down  the aggregate  ETE. This also implies  that as more and more products  in the USA go outside
the quota route owing  to the gradual dismantling  of the MFA,  the gap between  the quota and all product
ETE will increase.  Apart from this dismantling  of the MFA, our hypothesis  (relating  to diversifying  away
from high ETE  products),  if correct, could  mean a further  increase  in the gap as exporters  diversify  away
from high ETE products.  However,  our data set is for too limited a time period and does not permit
testing of this hypothesis.  It should be noted that the quota allocation policy does not encourage  much
diversification: the non-quota  exporters  (NQE) entitlement  is only 5 percent. Implicitly, the policy is
saying  that non-quota  exports  is its own reward.  Since  NQE  entitlement  raises  the level of competition  for
entrenched  firms, policy makers  should  think  of a significant  increase  in this.
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The data set for textiles is far more limited than for garments.  Table 9 shows the ETEs for yarn and
fabrics  for the USA and EU, mainly for 1995  and 1996.  The strongest  conclusion  that can be drawn from
13the table is that the ETE for yarn is significantly  higher  than for fabric, cloth etc. Again, average ETEs
are somewhat  higher for the USA  than for the EU.
III.  Policy Restrctions on Growth  in the Garnent industry
The garment industry  is based on a system of decentralized  production. This owes at least partly
to the existence  of labor legislation  and the lack of an effective  exit policy, as well as the reservation  of
garment  and hosiery production  for the small-scale  sector.  1
4 However,  decentralized  production  also has
natural advantages  such as cheap labor in the subcontracted  firms as well as flexibility of production.
The question  that now  arises is that is the decentralized  system of production  getting to be a constraint  to
investment  and therefore  to increased  productivity  and growth  of the apparel industry?
Garments are manufactured  in three stages '5: cutting the fabric to patterns, usually done by
power-operated  cutting machines; making or sewing the garment on sewing machines, either foot-
operated  or power-operated;  andfinishing the garment  by trimming,  checking  for dimensions,  washing,
ironing  and packing. The  most labor-intensive  part of the process  is the sewing  operation. Most firms in
India outsource  at least the sewing operation, which, together with cutting, constitutes 21.5 percent of
overall costs (in Khanna's (1991) survey). Materials contributed  54.5 percent of costs, while finishing
and overheads  contributed  9 and 15 percent  respectively. The firms who provide  the sewing services  are
typically called fabricators.
Most firms in India use the decentralized  form of production  organization. In Khanna's (1991)
study, 157 out of 175 firms that provided data had resorted to subcontracted  production,  and only 18
reported complete in-house production. Depending  on the order, a merchant exporter could be using
from two to twenty fabricators at any point of time.  Since the garment industry has seen impressive
growth in the past ($872 million in 1985-86  to $3676  million in 1995-96),  it means that the production
structure has so far served the industry very well.  Khanna (1991: 115) labels the fabricators as the
"...backbone  of the apparel industry  in India". The advantages  have been low wages in the fabricating
firms, flexibility  in meeting  even small orders,  and creativity  of Indian  designers  in fabric printing.
14 Alam (1991), in a study of small  industrial  firms,  found  that firms  deliberately  minimize  the size  of the labor  force  in order  to
reduce  the bargaining  power  of employees  and to avoid  legal obligations  towards  them. The  commonest  way  to do this is  to
separate  the most labor  intensive  production  process,  ie fabrication  in the case of garments,  and get this work  done by outside
contractors.
15  This  draws  on Khanna  (1991),  chapter  7.
14It would not be unfair to say that Indian garment exports have been niche-based,  focusing on
low volume and high variety of outputs,  within the broad area of fashion clothing and especially ladies
outerwear. The flexibility in the Indian production  system is eminently  suited to meet this demand. In
fact, the nature of demand  and the characteristics  of the production  system are mutually  reinforcing. The
downside  of relying on fabricators  implies that there can be variations in different lots of output,  which
means that India gets excluded from the mass market for clothing, which demands good and consistent
quality across huge volumes  of a single item of clothing,  such as in uniforms. 16 Moreover,  the average
quality of output,  although  much improved,  still has not allowed  it to go beyond  the middle price range.
In this context, it is interesting  to observe that all the countries with very successful garment
exports  have a much lower level of subcontracting  than  India. As Khanna's (1993: 285) study  points out,
apparel firms in India subcontracted  74 percent of their output, compared with only 11 percent for
Hongkong,  18  percent for China,  20 percent for Thailand,  28 percent for South  Korea and 36 percent for
Taiwan. All these countries have a broader base of exports,  and have done very well in the market for
large volumes of uniform  products. The implication  of this observation  as well as that in the previous
paragraph  is that in order for Indian  exports to grow substantially  beyond present levels, there may be a
need to change  the current  overwhelming  reliance  on fabricators.
With the managed trade era in textiles due to be phased out in 2005, it is important  that Indian
industry be prepared for a much more competitive  environment,  both at home as well as in foreign
markets. Even the domination  by India of market niches described  above is not likely to last forever,
based as it is on strengths  arising  basically  from natural resources  and factor endowments,  namely cheap
and flexible labor and raw cotton.  As is well-known  from product  cycles, strengths based on cheap
labor can only be transitory, as some other country with cheaper labor will eventually come and
displace the existing country from international  markets.  Even if we neglect this possibility on the
grounds  that this transition  may be a long way away,  it is nevertheless  true that in order for Indian  apparel
exports to  improve or even sustain current growth rates, one key requirement will be investment  in
assembly-line  production in factories.  This would be so that quality, consistency and tight delivery
schedules  can  be maintained,  as has been done in other  parts of Asia.
Much of the garment industry  is aware  that factory investment  is needed,  but has been unwilling
to commit itself to larger investments. This is partly because of failures of some high-profile  ventures
16 In Khanna's  (1993)  study  of  149  apparel  manufacturers  in five countries  of SE  Asia,  manufacturers  in Hong  Kong and
Thailand  observed  that Indian  garments  lacked  consistency  and uniformity  in quality.
15into garment  factories, at least partly on account of labor problems.  It is not as if there  are no  large
organized sector firms in the country-quite  the contrary.  What is then thatmakes  the garment industry
so different or unable to handle the labor issue?  Perhaps it is the high export orientation of the industry as
well as its focus on fashion goods, wherein even a short strike can cripple the firm.  A second reason for
lack of investment in factories is that the domestic fabric base is not fully compatible with the demands of
factory production, with large lengths of uniform lots of fabric, which are needed for factories, not being
produced in the domestic sector.  This is because fabrics are sourced largely from (small) powerlooms
and/or because of lack of good quality dyeing and printing facilities for fabrics.
Box: Comparison of Garment Factories in Asian Countries
Table  - A:  Productivity  Levels  of Apparel  Firms(No.  of pieces  per  machine  per  day)
Ladies  blouses  Gents  shirts  Ladies  dresses  Ladies  Skirts  Trousers
S. Korea  14.6  17.4  8.8  17.5  15.6
Taiwan  18.9  18.2  12.4  16.6  16.1
Hongkong  20.6  20.9  20.2  19.3  19.3
China  10.9  14.0  7.8  13.0  6.7
Thailand  17.0  19.8  12.2  20.5  13.1
idia  10.2  9.1  6.3  9.6  6.8
Source:  Khanna  (1993:  282).
The comparison  above is based on individual  field surveys  of 177  firns in India and 149  frms in the other
countries done by Khanna in all the countries over 1991/92  except India where it was done in 1987.17 The
comparison  pertains  to single  machine  workstation  assembly  lines only,  which are manned  by single operators.  The
figures  demonstrate  that the number  of pieces produced  per machine  per day in Indian  factories  is lowest  amongst
all countries,  and is less than 50 percent of the productivity  in Hongkong. These differences  can be put down to
levels of investment (see table B) as well as organization  of production, and possibly to  skills and worker
specialization.
Table B below highlights  the very low levels  of investment  in Indian firms.  The average investment  in
machines  in an Indian factory was $ 29760 as compared  with an investment  of $ 2.5 million in Hongkong  and
nearly $ 1 million in China.  This in turn reflects the smaller size of the Indian firm, with an average of 119
machines  per fimn  as against 698 in Hongkong  and 605 in China. Perhaps  more importantly,  it reflects the lower
levels of investment  per machine, with investment in India being only $ 250 per machine versus $ 3510 in
Hongkong  and $ 1500  in China. As the table shows,  this is due to Indian firms  having a much higher  proportion  of
manual  machines,  as well as the fact  that even  their power  machines  are undoubtedly  less sophisticated  (see  table C
below). In fact, the proportion  of manual  machines  is very low  even  in low  wage countries  like China.
17 There  may  as a result  be some  downward  bias  in  India's  figures,  but  this  may  not  be very  significant  since  no  major  structural
changes  took  place  over  the period  1987-1991.
16Table  - B: Machinery  and Investment  Levels  by Apparel  Export  Firms(Unit:  Nos)
Total  machines  Manual  machines  Power  machines  Investmnent('000)  Inv.  ('000  $)per  machine
S. Korea  258.08  6.14  240.33  722.19  2.79
Taiwan  264.62  0.15  264.46  579.21  2.18
Hongkong  698.12  4.35  688.76  2456.64  3.51
China  605.15  1.5  603.65  943.86  1.5
Thailand  572.32  0  572.32  722.25  1.26
India  119.28  37.26  75.39  29.76  0.25
Source:  Individual  country  surveys  by Khanna  (1993:  270)
Further demonstration  of the low level investment  in India is available  from the following  table, which
shows  that  most of Indian  firms' investment  is in sewing  machines  and that special  and processing  machines  form a
very small  part of the total  number  of machines,  unlike  other  countries  surveyed.
The data for India  fits in with the known  constraints  under  which  finns operate.  Industrial  policy  precludes
large  investments  in the garments  sector in India, unless  50 percent  of the output  is exported. On the other hand, in
the other countries shown, which are also more successful  exporters, investment is high, even in  low wage
countries.  The inescapable  conclusion  is that such investments  are needed in India, but are constrained  by the
reservation  policy  as well as by the inspector  raj syndrome  connected  with  the implementation  of labor  laws, and  the
lack of a flexible  labor  policy.
Table  -C: Typewise  no. of machines  installed  by Apparel Export Firms (nos.)
Precutting  machines Cutting  machines Sewing  machines  Special  machines Processing  machines
S. Korea  2.9  12.3  134.3  77.5  31.0
Taiwan  2.6  7.5  185.1  49.5  12.8
Hongkong  2.3  13.2  455.4  112.7  27.9
China  2.3  13.2  450.5  104.8  34.4
Thailand  2.0  12.8  460.8  72.4  21.9
India  0.0  2.3  103.7  8.6  4.6
Estimated on basis of data from  Textiles Committee, Mumbai for India. For other countries, from  Individual country surveys.
Source:  Khanna (1993: 275)
Our  own  judgment  on  this  is  that  subcontracting  is  a  low-risk  low-capital  strategy.  With
subcontracting, the bulk of the labor force is "outsourced", which results in a major decline in fixed costs.
Investments in equipment and factory space are also minimized.  Exporters are unwilling to trade this off
against an unproven and high risk strategy, unless their backs are pushed to the wall (i.e. demand for the
present kind of products starts declining), which has not happened so far.  Risks are high because:  one,
labor becomes a fixed cost in India owing to the grave difficulty of shedding labor in an industry where
demand can be cyclical; two, while investing in a large factory for garments, exporters have to make a
commitment to export 50 percent of  their output in perpetuity.  While actual exports may be more than
the  commitments,  the  obligation  and  the  attendant monitoring  by  the  authorities  enhances  the  risk
perception for the investor; three (and this  is more speculative), the factory mode may  make the final
product more expensive  (albeit of higher quality),  for which the  off-take from the domestic  market is
17uncertain, since it is still highly price sensitive, and which may make the exporter more export-oriented
than he would like to be/or the government requires him to be.
As far as the Government is concerned, it needs to have a longer time horizon than industry.  It
therefore needs to  reduce the disincentives of operating in the factory mode.  Several actions can be
contemplated along these lines.  One, abolish the reservation for small-scale industry  in the garment
sector, as recommended by the recent Abid Husain Committee (1997) on small-scale industry (which has
recommended complete  abolition of small  scale reservation in  all sectors). Two, and this  needs to  be
accompany SSI dereservation,  introduce a labor policy wherein labor can be  retrenched if necessary,
with appropriate safeguards. Three, include the garment industry in the list of industries for  automatic
approval for foreign direct investment up to 51 percent foreign equity.l8 Four, make imported fabrics
available  for export production  in an effective manner: currently, there  are long delays in shipments,
clearance  and  we  understand there  are several problems  in the  operation of the  duty  free  input for
exports schemes (see also following section). Five, remove the policy bias'  against synthetic fibers (see
following section) in the shape of high taxation, thereby increasing the domestic base of synthetic fibers
and providing the factories an additional source of demand.
The interesting aspect of encouraging the factory mode is that the putting out mode will continue
to thrive well into the foreseeable future.  By and by, the product segments addressed by the two systems
will become entirely different.  At the same time, factories may continue to subcontract those elements of
the process which do not compromise on quality, such as removal of waste threads from the garment.
IV.  Policy  Constraints  in Input  Supplies:  the  Cotton,  Yarn  and  Fabric  SectorsL9
It  is  almost  axiomatic  that  an  industry of  such  importance  as  textiles  will,  in  the  Indian
environment, be accompanied by extensive policy intervention.  However, continued interventions in the
industry could be counter-productive.  We will list some of the key constraints as they continue to apply
to the industry.  There is necessarily an element of judgment  in this  and the order in which the list is
presented,  but we believe  these to be the critical issues, a resolution  of which would  see a release  of
productive forces and thereby lead to a major increase in efficiency and production.
18  Automatic  approvals  mean  that if the investor  complies  with  certain  clear  norms,  the investment  will be automatically
"approved".  Industries  not on this Government  list have to await  clearance  from the Foreign  Investment  Promotion  Board.
19See also  report  by the World  Bank on Cotton  and Textiles  Sectors  (1997)  for a detailed  discussion  on many  of these  issues.
18Perhaps the most critical aspect is the policy bias against synthetic fibers.  This arose from the
view that "...cotton  is for the masses and synthetics for the classes!" 2 0 as well as a concern  for cotton
producers.  Man-made fibers (MM4F)  have always been subject to higher rates of indirect taxation vis-A-
vis  similar  cotton  based  products.  Moreover,  domestic  costs  of manufacturing  synthetic  fibers  and
polyester  filament  yarn  are  high  on  account  of  uneconomic  plant  size  in  an  industry  where  scale
economies were very important.  This arose from the industrial licensingpolicy which licensed relatively
small plants for production of specified outputs with little inter-fiber flexibility.  The latter policy changed
with the coming of the textile Policy of 1985, which adopted a distinct multi-fiber approach.  However,
although the  gap has narrowed, tax policies still discriminate against MMF  vis-a-vis  cottons, and this
discrimination at the fiber stage continues into the yarn and fabric stages. For example, while the excise
duty  on  cotton  yarn  in  1997-98 was  5.75%,  it  was  20.7%  on  blended  yarn  and  34.5%  on  PFY
(Polypropylene Filament Yarn). 21 Moreover, imported inputs for production of PSF (Polyester  Staple
Fiber) and PFY are still subject to high duties (for example, it is currently 25 percent on DMT, PTA and
MEG and 30 percent on caprolactum).
Table  10 gives an illustration  of the decline  in the policy bias.  The rates of customs duty on
synthetic fibers and inputs into the production of synthetic fibers have been declining gradually over the
years.  The table shows that customs duties (not including countervailing  duty which is essentially the
excise duty on the imported good) on the most important fibers have declined: for VSF (Viscose Staple
Fiber), from 60 percent  in 1987, to 25 percent in 1996; for PSF and ASF (Acetate  Staple Fiber), from
more than  150 percent in 1987, to 45 percent in 1996 and 32 percent in 1997.  Duties on inputs such as
DMT, PTA, MEG, Caprolactum and Acrylonitrile have declined from 90-195 percent in 1987 to 20-45
percent in 1996.
Along with this, the domestic industry has also become more competitive, both at the input stage
as well as the output of fibers.  This is shown in Table 11 by the NPCs (Nominal Protection Coefficients
i.e. basic ex-factory price/cif price): decliningNPCs  signify that domestic production is becoming more
competitive  and NPC  less than  one means that domestic  production  is cheaper than  the  international
benchmark.  VSF was already close to international prices by  1987 (NPC of 1.05) and has consistently
had an NPC less than one thereafter.  PSF and ASF, the fibers which were less competitive to begin with,
2 0 Ramakrishna (1995:  5), in a discussion paper on restructuring the textile industry.
21 For details, see World Bank (1997), volume II, annexi.
19have also seen a steady decline in their NPCs, from 2.5-3 in 1984 to  1.3-1.5 by  1993 (helped by the
devaluation of the rupee  in 1991 and  a depreciation thereafter), and by  1996 all the three  fibers were
competitive.  The inputs that go into fiber production have also witnessed decliningNPCs  in all cases,
and at least for two of the most important (DMT and PTA), domestic prices were competitive by  1996.
On comparing tables 10 and 11, it is evident that there is now substantial 'waterin  the tariff'  for
VSF, PSF, ASF, DMT, PTA and caprolactum, in fact some of the domestic prices are lower than border
prices.
On account  of the mix of the  above policies, India's  production, consumption  and  export of
textiles  and garments is still heavily weighted in favor  of cotton based products.  For example,  cotton
exports were 83 percent by volume and 75 percent by value of all apparel exports from India in 1993. As
against this, world  exports and consumption are predominantly in the  synthetic blends.  For example,
table 12 shows that synthetic consumption as a proportion of total consumption of different fibers in 1992
was roughly 70 percent in Korea, 66 percent in Germany, 62 percent in Japan, 56 percent in the USA, 44
percent in Indonesia, 42 percent in Thailand, but only 18 percent in India.  In India, at least, production
follows consumption patterns quite  closely.  But it also means that India's  production  goes against the
grain, and means that it effectively  shuts itself  out of a large part of the world market for textiles and
garments.  Although domestic production and consumption of MMF has been increasing (see table 13),
the policy  bias still prevails and needs to be redressed.
The policy bias still prevails in the following way: one, controls on export of cotton and cotton
yarn mean that prices of raw cotton are typically below international prices, which is an implicit subsidy
to the consumers of cotton; two, the still high import duties on synthetic yarn and intermediates;  three,
the domestic duties such as excise are lower for cotton fabrics.  All this means that the natural advantage
towards cotton (arising from India's  competitiveness in cotton production) has been given a major boost
by government policy.  Over time, this is changing with the increasing efficiency of domestic producers
of MMF, and indeed the consumption mix has been changing gradually away from cotton.  This trend can
be accelerated by equalizing excise duties for different fibers, and providing inputs at international prices
for the MMF producing industry.  The same logic should be extended to the fabric  stage, and at  least
garment  exporters,  if  not  manufacturers,  should have  effective  recourse  to  imported  fabrics  of  all
varieties.  In doing this, there will be the lurking fear amongst policy makers that the cotton  economy
may  be  disrupted.  However,  this  need  not  happen,  since  there  is  immense  potential  to  increase
20consumption and especially exports several fold, which would mean an overall increase in demand for
cotton (since blends use a lot of cotton), even if there is some substitution by MMF.
The potential gains from promoting a true multi-fiber policy cannot be precisely  estimated, but
the possibilities are very promising.  One could think of an increase in India's  overall exports based on
the world demand pattern of non-cotton to cotton consumption, using as a base the current value of cotton
based  exports.  In  1995-96, 70 percent of garment exports of US$ 4464  million and  69 percent of all
textiles exports including garments of US$ 9023 million were cotton-based.  If, on the other hand, cotton-
based exports had been only 50 (40) percent of total exports, and assuming no decrease in cotton exports,
total exports of textiles  in  1995-96 would have been US$  12492 (15615 if 40 percent),  and garments
would have been US$ 6242  million (7803 if 40 percent). Thus, had India's  policies  not been  cotton-
biased, its textile and garments  exports could have  been as much as  75 percent  higher  than they are
today. Of course the domestic bias could have been substantially mitigated had the import duty drawback
and the duty free import for export system worked efficiently.
Promotion  of the  handloom  sector  has  been  a  central  feature  of the  textile  policy  in India.
According to the Ministry of Textiles Annual Report of 1995-96, handlooms provide direct and indirect
employment to  over 3 million weaver households.  This, as well  as the need  to preserve  culture and
heritage, has meant that the Government has used several instruments to prop up the handloom sector.
One of these is the reservation of 22 textile articles for exclusive production in the handloom sector,
according to the latest policy on this issue dated August  1996.  The implementation of this policy got a
boost when in 1994, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions challenging the Handlooms (Reservations
of Articles  for Production)  Act  1985.  In  1995-96, the government inspected  63280 powerlooms  and
lodged FIRs against 15 for violation of this order!
The futility of this policy can be gauged from the fact that there were, according to Government
estimates, as many as 1.4 million powerlooms in India by the end of 1995.  As Misra (1993) points out,
the policy ignores the dismal past record of enforcement measures  as well  as the huge  administrative
machinery  that  is  required  to  enforce  this  policy.  Besides  requiring  this  totally  unproductive
administration, the policy is also a breeding ground for corruption.  It is no surprise thatMisra concludes
that the Act has made little material  difference to the state of the handloom sector.  We would therefore
recommend a scrapping of this policy.  Given, however, that the preservation of handlooms is linked with
preservation of culture  and heritage, and that the Govermnent may therefore still wish to preserve it, it
21would be preferable to do that via a direct scheme to help the sector rather than penalize other sectors by
restricting their output.
Impact of the Hank Yarn Obligation:  The policy stipulates that spinning mills  should supply
not less than 50 percent of the yarn marketed by them  in the form of hanks for use by the handloom
sector.  Hank yarn is exempted from excise and sales tax, and opens up the possibilities of corruption,
misdeclaration  and so on.  There have been both direct costs of this policy as well as the longer term
impact on investment decisions.  Misra (1993) advocates  that the obligation be done away with, and if
necessary  independent  hank  reeling  centers  close  to  handloom  concentrations  could  be  set  up  by
handloom development agencies.  22
All these policy restrictions impair the efficiency of the industry and result in an upward shift in
its supply curve. This  in turn  results  in a  lower  measured ETE than  would have  prevailed  in a  less
constraining policy environment. Removing these restrictions will be vital in the post quota world where
competitiveness will be the key.
V.  Trade  Policies  and Procedures
With the substantial easing of trade restrictions, and especially with the bilateral treaties with the
US and the EU  signed  in  1994, imports of raw cotton, yarn, and selected fabrics  have been  freed 23.
Tariffs have come down and are slated to go down further in terms of the treaties with the EU and the
USA  (to levels  between  20  and 40  percent by  the year  2000).  The problem that  remains  is one  of
procedures.  Nair  and  Kaul  (1996)  have  documented  these  bottlenecks  and  transaction  costs  in  the
process  of  exporting  garments  from the  country.  They  document the  fact  that  the  procedures  for
exporting and importing remain very cumbersome, and there are substantial delays at each stage of the
process.  For example,  in getting  a duty  free advance  license for export production, the  average time
taken  by 35 exporters  was 7 months. Another two months on average were needed for redeeming the
legal undertaking, making it 9 months in all.  On the other hand, at a cost ofRs. 10000, the exporter could
22 For details,  see annex  3, World  Bank,  vol. 2 (1997: 10-12). Also  see Misra  (1993:  223-26).
23 In exchange  for increases  in MFA  quotas  in the US and EU, India  liberalized  its policies  on imports  of textiles  and garments.
Imports  of wool tops, synthetic  fibers,  textile  yarns  and some industrial  fabrics  were freed in early 1995.  While products such  as
selected textile fabrics, selected textile products and apparel items were made eligible to be imported with a new import license,
it was agreed that these would be freed at a future date  (in 1998, 2000 or 2002). Though negotiated  bilaterally, these reforms
apply to all countries exporting to India (i.e. on a most favored nation basis).
22get his license in 2.5 months, and for another Rs. 8000 could get his legal undertaking redeemed in  15
days. Similarly, at a cost of 3-5 percent of the drawback claim, the exporter could collect his  drawback
claim within 7 days instead of 6 months!  Such examples abound  through the paper.
In most cases, the exporter has no option but to pay up or  else get rejected or at the least suffer
very costly delays.  This means that the system is in effect imposing a direct tax burden on the exporter or
importer, as the case may be. If we assume that the post-bribe situation is the least that the trader can live
with in terms of delays, then the amount he pays is the tax for the provision  of minimum  acceptable
service.  For an exporter,  it would be an equivalent to an export tax, whose incidence would be lower for
larger value of exports or imports, since many bribe transactions are reckoned in terms of absolute values.
This export tax would reduce export profitability, and in a dynamic sense, also lower the incentives to
invest in export activity.  Even if the exporter managed to load the costs on to export prices,  it could
create incentives for alternative sources of goods by the importers abroad.  Analytically, therefore,  an
improvement in transaction times through legal channels is exactly equivalent to a reduction in the export
tax.  Since the government  does not collect any of this  tax, and instead loses  potential investment  in
exports, it would be in its self-interest (defined in terms of the national good) to reduce transaction times
as well as to reduce the maze of procedures that traders still have to follow.
VI.  Conclusion:
We have seen that the international trade regime in textiles  and clothing continues to impose a
distortionary tax on Indian exports. In this paper, we sought to calculate the export tax equivalent (ETE)
for garment and textile exports to the USA and the EU. ETEs can be thought of as a measure of excess
demand, given the existence of quota restrictions  and a certain level of supplier capabilities.  Thus  the
ETE  is  a  measure  of  restrictiveness  of  the  quota  regime.  In  interpreting  ETEs  as  a  measure  of
competitiveness, however, additional information on competing countries'  ETEs, quotas  and exports is
needed.
ETEs for garments were high for the USA, in the range of 28-37 percent over 1993-1996. For the
EU, the range was 14-19 percent. However, while there was a decline in the ETE for USA in 1996, there
was a corresponding  increase in the EU. It is too early to say whether the decline in the US represents a
decline  in  the  competitiveness  of  Indian  exports  (assuming  here  that  ETE  does  indeed  represent
23competitiveness)  arising  from  the NAFTA-induced  strength of Mexican  exports.  But  it  could  be a
warnig  signal.
In the literature  to  date, we  have not observed any disaggregation  of ETE by  fiber. A priori
hypothesising would say that importing countries would try to restrict Indian cotton exports more than
synthetics. This was confirmed by our analysis for the USA, where we found the weighted average ETEs
for  cottons  substantially  higher  than  that  for  synthetic  garments.  However,  this  tendency  was  not
observed for the EU.
Our analysis showed that as far as India is concerned, the USA lags behind the EU in terms of
reducing the restrictiveness  of the quota regime. This can be inferred from: one, a higher share of Indian
exports to EU are non-restricted; two, average ETEs are lower in the EU; three, the fiber-wise and within-
fiber  ETEs  showed  that  the  EU,  unlike  the  USA,  did  not  discriminate  between  fibers  in  placing
restrictions on Indian exports.
The international trade  regime is not the sole problem faced by the exporters of garments and
textiles in India. There is, in addition, a set of formidable domestic policy hurdles they have to contend
with. These include reservation  of the garment production for the small scale sector, lack of a flexible
labor policy, policy bias against synthetic fibers, very high transaction costs of export activity, and some
anachronistic policies such as handloom reservation and hank yarn obligation.
In both the garment and textiles sectors, India's strengths lie basically in natural resources and
factor endowments - namely cheap labor and raw cotton. Also, the garment industry is based on a system
of decentralized production i.e. subcontracting, which is  a low-risk, low-capital strategy. This production
structure has served the industry fairly well so far but it has also ensured the exclusion of Indian products
from the mass market for clothing, which demands good and consistent quality across large volumes of a
single item of clothing. Thus  an assembly-line,  factory-type system of production may  be necessary  if
exports are to grow well beyond current levels.
The dismantling  of the  quota regime  represents both  an  opportunity as well  as a  threat.  An
opportunity  because markets  will no  longer be restricted;  a threat  because  markets  will no  longer be
guaranteed by  quotas, and  even the  domestic market will be open to  competition. This means that  in
today's  world, observed ETEs would  surely have been higher if the industry had been relieved  of the
documented domestic  policy constraints. In tomorrow's  world, on the other hand, the  continued well-
being of the industry may depend on timely action to relax these policy constraints.
24ANNEX
Table 1 - TRENDS IN INDIAN EXPORTS OF TEXTILES AND GARMENTS (US $mil.)
l 1996-97  (Q.E.)  1995-96  1994-95  1993-94
Total Indian exports, f.o.b.  33768.0  32311.0  26855.0  22683.0
Export of yarn, textiles and garments, of which,  7990.4  7468.7  6352.0  4739.0
Cotton yarn, fabrics, made-ups etc.  3113.5  2576.8  2234.0  1537.0
Readymade garments of which,  4762.2  4502.3  4458.7  3653.4
Cotton garments  3418.4  3150.2  3127.7  2744.4
(71.78)  (69.97)  (70.15)  (75.12)
Synthetic garments  1176.9  1179.8  1160.7  794.7
(24.71)  (26.20)  (26.03)  (21.75)
Readymade garments of which,
Export to USA  1352.7  1200.0  1257.9  930.2
(28.40)  (26.65)  (28.21)  (25.46)
Export to EU  1900.3  1969.7  2042.4  1522.9
(39.90)  (43.75)  (45.81)  (41.68)
Figures in brackets show percentages of readymade garments, Q.E.: Quick Estimate
Source: Economic Survey, 1996-97, Handbook of Export Statistics, Data from Ministry of Commerce
25Table  2 - Export  Tax Equivalents  for Indian  Garment  Exports to the USA  and the EU (Percent)
Category  1996  1995  1994  1993
USA:
Group  I
Weighted average  31.3  41.2  37.8  44.1
Simple average  23.4  25.9  24.7  32.8
Group  II
Weighted average  0.6  0.8  9.7  5.8
Simple average  1.3  1.5  14.6  13.8
Total
Weighted average  28.0  36.9  35.7  38.8
Simple average  6.4  7.2  17.1  18.5
Cotton
Weighted average  38.9  51.0  50.9  48.2
Simple average  14.2  15.8  23.7  28.1
Synthetics
Weighted average  16.4  16.4  13.0  4.7
Simple average  10.4  13.1  19.0  11.8
EU:
Total
Weighted average  18.6  14.4  13.9  14.0
Simnple  average  14.8  11.9  12.9  12.5
Cotton
Weighted average  17.4  13.3  14.1  13.7
Simple average  16.2  12.7  14.3  14.3
Synthetics
Weighted average  22.9  16.8  9.0  14.5
Simple average  12.6  10.6  11.4  10.8
26Table  3 -Product Level  Export  Tax Equivalents  for the USA  (Percent)
Category  Description  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993
USA  GROUP-I
334/634  Other coats M &B  12.6  ...  ...  ...  ...
335 / 635  Coats and jackets WG & I  2.1  5.5  ...  ...  ...
336 / 636  Dresses including uniforms  26.6  33.6  31.6  32.7  33.8
338 / 339  Knit shirts M & B & knit blouses W & G  37.6  57.8  101.1  84.4  134.4
340 / 640  Gents shirts not knit  42.4  50.8  53.8  71.9  75.3
341  Ladies blouses notknit  6.8  10.4  13.4  18.7  19.3
342/642  Ladies skirts  11.3  14.4  21.8  16.5  12.3
347 / 348  Trousers/slacks/M & B/WG & 1  31.5  31.6  29.1  19.1  29.9
shorts (outer) M & B/WG & I
351 / 651  Night shirts pyjamas and other night wear  10.8  21.2
641  Ladies blouses and shirts not knit W & G  3.9  8.4  8.4  4.5  23.7
USA GROUP-H
Cotton Fibres
237  Play suits,sun suits, wash suits,creepers,  2.6  1.6  2.0  17.7  15.0
rompers etc. of cotton & man made fiber
239  Infantwear  of cotton and man made fiber  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.8  0.9
330 Handkerchiefs  1.7  1.0  1.3  9.8  20.6
331 Gloves and mittens  6.3  3.9  4.8  50.1  60.0
333 Suit type coats M&B  1.5  0.9  1.1  12.9  9.5
349 Brassiers and body supporting garments  0.8  0.5  0.6  4.3  4.8
350 Dressing gowns including bathrobes, dusters etc.  3.0  1.8  2.3  24.3  27.6
352 Underwear  5.4  3.3  4.1  9-0  7.3
359 Other apparels  0.2  0.1  0.2  1.6  1.3
MMF
630 Handkerchiefs  1.8  1.1  1.4  10.8  3.0
631 Gloves and mittens  5.3  3.3  4.1  5.0  3.7
632 Hosiery
633 Suittype  coats M&B  2.5  1.6  1.9  20.3  18.9
638 Knit shirts (including T-shirts) M&B  1.9  1.2  1.5  15.0  20.1
639 Knitshirts&knittedblouses  2.1  1.3  1.6  10.4  7.9
(including T-shirts) W&G
643 Suit M&B  1.5  0.9  1.2
644 Suit W&G  6.2  3.8  4.7  37.2  37.1
645 Sweaters M&B  2.3  1.5  1.8  22.5  25.0
646 Sweaters W&G  2.6  1.6  2.0  21.8  25.7
649 Brassiers and body supporting garments
650 Dressing gowns including bathrobes, dusters etc.  4.5  2.8  3.4  31.5  21.3
652 Underwear  1.2  0.7  0.9  9.1  8.5
659 Other apparels  0.3  0.2  0.3  1.6  1.9
SILK AND OTHER VEGETABLE FIBERS LIKE RAMIE, LINEN, SISAL ETC.
833 Suit type coats M&B  1.1  0.7  0.9  8.5  8.0
834 Other coats M&B  1.4  0.9  1.0  10.2  12.0
835  CoatsandjacketsW&G  1.2  0.7  0.9  26.2  15.2
836  Dresses  2.1  1,3  1.7  18.0  16.1
840  Shirts and blouses not knit  1.1  0.7  0.9  10.0  9.7
842 Ladies skirts  1.4  0.9  1.1  10.5  8.9
845 Sweater (othervegetable  fiber)  2.8  1.7  2.2  17.1  17.5
847 Trousers slacks (M&B W &G), shorts  0.9  0.6  0.7  7.8  8.8
859 Other apparel  0.2  0.1  0.1  1.8  1.6
For 1997 the unit values of exports have been assumed to be the same as in 1996
27Table 4 - Product Level Export Tax Equivalents for the EU (Percent)
Category  Description  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993
4  KT. Shirts,T-shirts,  similar  KT.  garments  18.1  28.3  14.5  13.2  12.0
5  Jerseys,  pullovers,  slipovers,  waistcoats,  2.9  3.1  5.8  10.1  5.7
twinsets,  cardigans,  bed  jackets and
jumpers (other  than  jackets  and blazers),
anoraks,  windcheater,  waister  KTD  or
crocheted.
6  Woven  trousers  for ladies  and gents,  5.9  9.0  9.6  10.4  6.9
woven  shorts  for  gents.
7  Ladies  blouses  4.0  4.3  7.0  10.3  10.5
8  Gents  shirts  9.9  12.6  11.3  14.2  14.8
26  Ladies  dresses  24.5  54.5  39.0  36.1  41.3
27  Ladies  skirts  4.1  5.1  4.8  8.6  7.1
29  Ladies  suits and ensembles  0.9  1.5  1.7  1.2  1.4
For 1997  the unit  values  of exports  have been  assumed  to be the same  as in 1996
28Table 5 -Export Tax Equivalents for Cotton Garments Exported to the EU (Percent)
Category  Description  1996  1995  1994  1993
4  KT. Shirts,T-shirts, similar KT. garments  27.83  14.63  13.32  11.82
5  Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, waistcoats,  3.29  6.38  11.34  6.58
twinsets, cardigans, bed jackets  and
jumpers (other than jackets  and blazers),
anoraks, windcheater, waister KTD or
crocheted.
6  Woven trousers for ladies and gents,  9.50  10.32  10.60  7.15
woven shorts for gents.
7  Ladies blouses  4.48  7.76  11.07  11.67
8  Gents shirts  12.38  11.25  14.14  14.73
26  Ladies dresses  65.11  43.33  43.05  53.23
27  Ladies skirts  5.41  5.26  9.52  7.47
29  Ladies suits and ensembles  1.73  2.68  0.95  1.52
Export Tax Equivalents for Cotton Garments Exported to the USA (Percent)
Category  Description  lYYh  1995  1994  19YJ
USA Group  I
335  Coats and jackets WG & I  6.64
336  Dresses including uniforms  39.41  34.66  38.80  33.42
338  Knit shirts M & B & knit blouses W & G  56.07  98.61  84.43  133.97
340  Gents shirts not knit  49.06  52.85  71.87  73.91
341  Ladies blouses not knit  11.04  13.36  18.68  19.34
342  Ladies skirts  13.57  22.92  16.73  12.22
347 / 348  Trousers/slacks/M & B/WG & I  31.03  29.17  19.07  29.44
shorts (outer) M & B/WG & I
351  Night shirts pyjamas and other night wear  21.00
USA GROUP-II
237  Play suits,sun suits, wash suits,creepers,  1.63  2.00  17.70  15.05
rompers etc. of cotton & man made fiber
239  Infant wear of cotton and man made fiber  0.124  0.15  0.84  0.86
330 Handkerchiefs  1.04  1.31  9.78  20.58
331 Gloves and mittens  3.90  4.87  50.15  59.97
333 Suittype  coats M&B  0.91  1.12  12.85  9.46
349 Brassiers and body supporting garments  0.53  0.65  4.35  4.79
350 Dressing gowns including bathrobes, dusters etc.  1.85  2.27  24.25  27.62
352 Underwear  3.34  4.14  9.01  7.28
359 Other apparels  1.26
29Table 6 -Export  Tax Equivalents  for Synthetic  Garments  Exported  to the USA (Percent)
Category  Description  1996  1995  1994  1993
USA  GROUP-I
635  Coats and jackets WG & 1  4.38  ...  ...  ...
636  Dresses including uniforms  30.24  29.36  27.88  ...
3381339  Knit shirts M & B & knit blouses W & G  47.86  110.55  77.31  ...
640  Gents shirts not knit  57.95  56.09  76.88  ...
642  Ladies  skirts  14.48  20.94  16.15  ...
347/348  Trousers/slacks/M & B/WG & 1  20.46  29.20  30.33  ...
shorts (outer) M & B/WG & I
651  Night shirts pyjamas and other night wear  16.69
641  Ladies blouses and shirts not knit W & G  8.10  8.44  4.49  ...
USA Group II
MMF
630 Handkerchiefs  1.12  1.37  10.84  2.98
631 Gloves and mittens  3.28  4.05  5.01  3.71
633 Suit type coats M&B  18.94
638 Knit shirts (including T-shirts) M&B  14.97  20.08
639 Knit shirts & knitted blouses  1.33  1.64  10.40  7.94
(including T-shirts) W&G
643 Suit M&B  0.94  1.16
644 Suit W&G  3.84  4.75  37.20  37.13
645 Sweaters  M&B  1.45  1.79  22.53  24.99
646 Sweaters  W&G  1.63  2.00  21.81  25.67
650 Dressing gowns including bathrobes, dusters etc.  2.79  3.44  31.46  21.26
652 Underwear  0.74  0.91  9.09
659 Other apparels  0.22  0.26  1.62  1.87
_  Export Tax Equivalents for Synthetic Garments Exported to the EU (Percent)
Category  Description  1996  1995  1994  1993
4  KT. Shirts,T-shirts, similar KT. garments  20.90  12.00  7.89  9.59
5  Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, waistcoats,  1.81  3.89  7.18  3.13
twinsets, cardigans, bed jackets  and
jumpers (other than jackets  and blazers),
anoraks, windcheater, waister KTD or
crocheted.
6  Woven trousers for ladies and gents,  7.94  8.63  10.16  6.54
woven shorts for gents.
7  Ladies blouses  3.82  5.98  8.99  8.87
8  Gents  shirts  12.72  11.59  15.42  14.96
26  Ladies  dresses  47.59  36.40  32.16  34.94
27  Ladies  skirts  4.80  4.48  7.99  6.82
29  Ladies suits and ensembles  1.39  2.11  1.38  1.29
30Table 7- Un- Restricted exports vis-a-vis total (US S million)
Country  Category  1996  1995  1994  1993
USA
Restricted  1223.2  1082.4  1162.4  852.2
(92.07)  (92.61)  (90.52)  (95.57)
UR  105.4  86.4  121.7  39.5
(7.93)  (7.39)  (9.48)  (4.43)
Total  1328.6  1168.8  1284.1  891.7
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
EU
Restricted  1358.5  1431.2  1044  939.6
(70.80)  (71.26)  (58.18)  (64.13)
UR  560.3  577.3  750.4  525.6
(29.20)  (28.74)  (41.82)  (35.87)
Total  1918.8  2008.5  1794.4  1465.2
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
Total Restrained
Countries  Restricted  2700.7  2625.9  2320.5  1885.2
(78.54)  (78.15)  (69.24)  (73.86)
UR  738.1  734.3  1030.7  667.3
(21.46)  (21.85)  (30.76)  (26.14)
Total  3438.8  3360.2  3351.2  2552.5
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
Countries  OBA
Total  1353.4  1113.3  1070.7  914.1
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
Grand Total
Restricted  2700.7  2625.9  2320.5  1885.2
(56.36)  (58.70)  (52.48)  (54.38)
3UR  2091.5  1847.6  2101.4  1581.4
(43.64)  (41.30)  (47.52)  (45.62)
Total  4792.2  4473.5  4421.9  3466.6
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)
UR= Products outside the bilateral agreements + non restricted products within bilateral agreements
31Table  8 - Export  Tax Equivalents  for all garments
1996  1995  1994  1993
USA
Only quota  products  28.03  36.9  35.66  31.67
All products  25.1  33.05  29.21  35.5
EU
Only quotaproducts  18.62  14.35  13.93  13.96
All products  11.92  9.46  8.01  8.85
All products: includes  all garments  exported  to the country  in that  year.
Only quota products:  includes  garments  having  positive  ETEs for any of the years, 1993-96.
32Table  9- Export  tax equivalents  for textile  products
Country/Category  1996  1995  1994  1993
Description  ETE  ETE  ETE  ETE
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent
USA
218 Yarn dyed  fabric  (Cotton/MMF)  33.05  38.81  13.54  7.95
219 Cotton  duck fabric  (Canvas)  7.63  3.57  4.05  2.03
313 Cotton  sheeting  7.28  4.72  ...  ...
314 Cotton  poplin  3.38  2.15  ...
315 Cotton  print cloth  12.80  9.60  ...  ...
317 Twill  cloth (cotton)  8.00  7.77  ...  ...
326 Cheese  cloth  (cotton)  2.84  2.00  ...  ...
363 Terry towels  (mostly  cotton)  12.46  11.76  ...  ...
369 (D) MM/PL  Dish cloth  (cotton)  14.42  9.08  ...  ...
369 (D) HL  Dish cloth  (cotton)
369 (S) MM/PL  Shop  towels  (cotton)  21.61  14.49  ...  ...
369 (S) HL  Shop  towels  (cotton)  0.00  ...  ...
Group  ll
Yarn  10.91  5.09  ...  ...
Fabrics Cotton  fabric  0.00
MMF Man made  (made  ups  etc.)  0.00  20.78  ...  ...
EEC
1 Cotton  yarn  not put up for retail  sale  14.31  20.52  ...  ...
2 Woven  fabrics  of cotton  other  than gauze,  14.38  17.07  ...  ...
terry  fabrics,  narrow  woven  fabrics,  pile
fabrics,  chenille  fabrics,  tulle and other
net fabrics
2 (a) of which:  other  than unbleached  or bleached  2.87  3.26  ...  ...
9 Terry  towelling  and other  similar  woven  terry  14.36  8.22  ...  ...
fabrics  of cotton:  toilet  linen  and kitchen  linen,
other  than knitted  or crocheted,  of terry
towelling  & similar  woven  terry  fabrics  of cotton.
20 Bed linen,  other  than knitted  or crocheted  2.07  3.26  ...  ...
39 Table  linen,  toilet and  kitchen linen,  other  than  0.00  0.00  ...  ...
knitted  or crocheted,  other  than of terry
towelling  or similar  terry  fabrics  of cotton
33Table 10 -Customs Duty  for Man-Made  Fibres
1984  1987  1989  1990  1993  1996
MMF
SF  37.0  60.0  55.0  40.0  40.0  25.0
SF  175.0  187.5  180.0  180.0  85.0  45.0
SF  140.0  155.0  145.0  150.0  85.0  45.0
Inputs
MT  140.0  195.0  195.0  150.0  70.0  35.0
TA  140.0  195.0  195.0  150.0  70.0  35.0
EG  110.0  150.0  90.0  150.0  70.0  35.0
aprolactum  90.0  90.0  75.0  75.0  60.0  45.0
crylonitrile  110.0  110.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  20.0
Source:  Office of the Textile Commissioner and
'Handbook of Statistics on Man-Made / Synthetic Fibre I Yarn Industry, Association  of Synthetic  Fibre
34Table  11 - Nominal  Protection  Coefficient
1984  1987  1989  1990  1993  1996
MMF
VSF  1.1  1.1  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.9
PSF  2.5  2.7  2.3  2.6  1.3  1.0
ASF  3.0  2.6  2.3  2.3  1.5  1.0
Inputs
DMT  ...  ...  ...  2.6  1.6  0.8
PTA  ...  ...  ...  2.5  1.7  1.0
MEG  ...  ...  ...  2.5  1.4  1.3
Caprolactum  ...  ...  ...  1.7  1.6  1.2
Acrylonitrile  ...  ...  ...  2.1  1.7  ...
Nominal Protection Coefficient: Basic Price / CIF Value
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Man-Made / Synthetic Fibre / Yarn Industry, Association  of Synthetic  Fibre  Industry,
and the Office of the Textile Commisioner
35Table 12 -Consumption  of Textiles  in 1992  (%)
Cotton  Wool  Cellulosics  Synthetics
India  72  2  8  18
hina  60  5  4  31
Pakistan  88  2  1  9
Indonesia  43  1  12  44
Malaysia  35  4  61
Thailand  50  1  7  42
Korea  22  4  4  70
US  37  2  5  56
Germany  17  6  11  66
Japan  26  6  6  62
Source: World Bank (1997)
36Table  13-  Per  capita  availability  of cloth
Year  Estimated  mid  year I  Availability  for home consumption  Per  capita availability
population  (Million  square  metres)  (Square  metres)
(In millions)  ICotton cloth IBlendedimixed  fabric  IMMF  fabrics |Cotton  cloth  TBlended/mixed  fabric  MMF  fabrics
1985-86  754.7  1134  1636  3003  15.03  2.17  3.98
1986-87  769.9  1138  1780  3236  14.79  2.31  4.2
1987-88  785.2  1089  174  3404  13.87  2.22  4.34
1988-89  800.4  1046  1833  3843  13.07  2.29  4.8
1989-90  815.7  10639  1676  3843  13.04  2.05  4.71
1990-91  832  10846  1940  4466  13.04  2.33  5.37
1991-92  851.5  1167  2539  4788  13.7  2.98  5.62
1992-93  870  13049  2367  4481  15  2.72  5.15
1993-94  889  1381  2806  6087  15.54  3.16  6.85
1994-95  906  12808  3122  6925  14.1  3.45  7.75
1995-96  920  13660  2964  766  14.85  3.22  8.44
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Man-Made /Synthetic Fibre / Yam Industry, Associatfon of Synthetic Fibre
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